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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of
the Utah Supreme Court (Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996)) and
was poured over to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-22(4) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the defendant preserve his claim that the trial court
used the wrong standard in denying the defendant's motion to
reduce Wright's conviction from a first degree felony to a second
degree felony# where no objection was made in the trial court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This issue is unique to this Court and

does not entail review of the district court's decision.

2.

Did the trial court use the correct statutory standard

in denying the defendant's motion to reduce Wright's conviction
from a first degree felony to a second degree felony.
STANDARD OP REVIEW:
imposing sentence.

A trial court has broad discretion in

State v. Sanwick, 713 P.2d 707, 708 (Utah

1986); State V. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1985).

For

questions of law, the reviewing court employs a correction of
error standard, and for questions of fact a "clearly erroneous"
standard applies.

State v. Rhodes. 818 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Utah

App. 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995)
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was found
guilty and to the history and character of the defendant,
concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as
being for that degree of offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to
that offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically
provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower
degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
In an information dated July, 1996, Brandon David Wright was
charged with, Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, Theft, a
class B misdemeanor, and unlawful possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.
2

R. 6-9.

On November 15,

1996, Wright pled guilty to the Aggravated Robbery charge.

The

two misdemeanor charges had been dismissed at the preliminary
hearing.

R. 69.

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed

to recommend that the defendant's conviction be sentenced as a
second degree felony.

R. 69.

It was understood by all parties

that the trial court had made no promises concerning how it would
rule on such a motion to reduce.

R. 71.

On January 3, 1997, Wright was sentenced to serve a sentence
of not less than five years to life at the Utah State Prison.
97.

R.

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to reduce the

sentence to a second degree felony.
appeal on January 31, 1997.

R. 96-97.

Wright filed this

R. 54-55.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Defendant pled guilty to aggravated robbery.

In July 1996,

Wright and another entered the victim's home for the purpose of
robbing him.

Defendant struck the victim repeatedly on the head,

neck, and upper body, with a metal table leg.

R. 7, 76-77, 92,

98.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the
defendant's motion to reduce the sentence to that for a second
degree felony.

At no time did the defendant object in any manner

3

to the trial courtfs decision on this issue.

The only statements

made concerning this issue were:
The Court: I believe the standard that Ifm required to
consider in determining whether or not to sentence a
person, who has pled guilty to a first degree, to a
lesser sentence, that is a second degree felony, is
there is some basis that is required by the interest of
justice. And I can't find any in this case.
The reasons that you suggest, Ms. Kreeck-Mendez,
are rational reasons, but thatfs not the basis in the
statute. So that motion is denied.
Is there any legal reason I should not impose
sentence?
Ms. Kreeck-Mendez: Your honor, if you want a legal
reason, I'd just like to make a record, that in the
interest of justice that he can go to trial on this
case, but for the State's recommendation, there is very
likely there would have been a trial in this case. So
I think the interest of justice are served by making
some time for plea arrangements in these type of cases.
Other than that, no.
The Court: I still don't think that* rises to the level
of something in the interest of justice, even when I
take into account the mental health issues, and I
recognize they're there. The motion is still denied.
R. 96-97.
In explaining why the defendant would not be granted
probation, the trial court more fully explained how he viewed the
nature and circumstances of the offense, and the history and
character of the defendant.
Mr. Wright, I'm obviously not interested in considering
you for the privilege of probation for a number of
reasons, not the least of which is the magnitude and
4

the degree of severity of this offense. You're
probably extremely lucky Mr. Lee [the victim] is not
dead. You seriously beat him. It's no excuse that you
were high on drugs. You presented at that point in
time, and I believe continue to present, until you get
these problems resolved, a serious risk to this
community. And I don't intend to put the community to
further risk with this type of conduct. It's
absolutely unacceptable. And there is a substantial
penalty that runs with this type of conduct. If you
are going to hurt somebody else to the degree you did
in this case then there is a serious debt to pay to
society. And that is what you are going to have to do.
It is unfortunate because, obviously, if you wrote
the document, which I believe you did, that you just
read, you're intelligent and you're bright, you are
articulate and it just wastes a good portion of your
life, before this. And now, because of this, you are
going to lose at least the next five years.
You can either make it work or just fall back in
the same things you did. The first time you served
your entire sentence. They tried you on parole and you
didn't do what you were supposed to. You ran; you
violated parole, so you served the full five years.
Most people spend a few months out there on a zero to
five commitment, but not you. They had to extradite
you back to Utah after you fled, and so you served the
entire five years. That's probably four years longer
than you had to because you couldn't abide by the
rules.
And there are maybe some mental health issues that
I intend to attach to this commitment. The
recommendation that the Board of Pardons needs to look
at these issues, if they want to look at them, they can
get them.
R. 98-99.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT
The issues raised by the defendant are raised for the first
time on appeal.

They were not preserved in the trial court by a
5

specific objection.

Nor was the trial court's decision plain

error.
Defendant's claim that the trial court had a very wide
discretion to grant his motion to reduce the conviction and
sentence is contrary to the plain language of the statute. The
statutory standard permits such reductions only when the regular
sentence would be unduly harsh.

The trial court applied the

correct standard and did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to reduce.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE HIS
CLAIMS AND CANNOT RAISE THEM FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL
Wright claims, for the first time on appeal, that the trial
court applied the wrong standard in denying the defendant's
motion to reduce his sentence.
in Espinal v, Salt Lake City Bd» pf EdvtCw 797 p.2d 412
(Utah 1990), the plaintiffs raised a constitutional claim for the
first time on appeal.

In refusing to consider that claim, the

Utah Supreme Court explained:
Appellants1 first claim is that the
realignment violated article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution by denying them the
liberty to control their children's
education. This claim was raised for the
6

first time on appeal. With limited
exceptions, the practice of this Court has
been to decline consideration of issues
raised for the first time on appeal. We
therefore do not address this claim.
Id. at 413 (citations omitted).

The limited exceptions to the

general rule referred to in Espinal deal with cases in which the
appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court committed
plain error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case."
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 (Utah App. 1992)
(footnote omitted).

See also State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 853

(Utah 1992); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992).
It was the duty of the defendant to raise any and all claims
in the trial court. Wright's claim that the trial court used the
wrong standard in considering his motion to reduce sentence was
not preserved in the trial court, and should not be considered on
appeal for the first time.
This is especially so in the circumstances of the present
case.

The defendants claim is based solely upon his

interpretation of what the trial court said in denying the
motion.

If the trial court had been aware that the defendant

believed it had used the wrong standard, Judge Timothy R. Hanson
would have had an opportunity to explain exactly what standard he
was actually using.

Because the trial court was not given such
7

an opportunity, it is now impossible to determine exactly what
Judge Hanson meant by the challenged words and what standard

the

trial court applied.
The mere fact that a motion to reduce was made did not in
some manner preserve the claim that the trial court used the
wrong standard in considering the motion.

Nor did the fact that

the motion to reduce the sentence takes up 12 pages of
transcript.

Aplt. Br. at 12.

Issues arising from sentencing are

subject to the "longstanding rule of appellate review" that the
failure to raise an issue in the trial court "precludes the issue
from being raised for the first time on appeal."
Bywaterr 748 P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987).

State v.

A specific objection

needed to be made to the particular error that the defendant
believed the trial court had committed.

Even a general objection

to the sentence has been held to be inadequate to preserve issues
for appeal.

State Y» Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah 1991).

II. THE TRIAL COURT'S CHALLENGED COMMENTS DO
NOT CONSTITUTE PLAIN ERROR
Defendant also claims that, based upon his interpretation of
the trial court's comments, the trial court committed plain error
in using the wrong standard in considering the motion to reduce
sentencing.

Defendant claims that the "[f]ailure to exercise

8

'very wide discretion1 over the matter should be treated as plain
error, since it is 'absolutely require [d]

!

under the case law."

Aplt. Br. at 13.
This Court has recently explained that to succeed on a plain
error claim, a defendant must demonstrate three points: first,
that an error exists, second, that the error should have been
obvious to the trial court, and third, that the error was
harmful.
1997).

State v. Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App.

Where, as here, no federal constitutional right is

implicated, "the test used for determining an error's harmfulness
is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that absent the error
a different result would have occurred."

State v. Emmett, 839

P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992).
To support his claim of plain error, defendant relies on
State v. LJPSky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980).

Lipsky

explained that a trial court exercises discretion in exercising
the "wide variety of alternatives" available to the court in
sentencing a criminal defendant.

Id.

These alternatives

include; prison sentence, imposing a fine, reducing the sentence,
probation, disqualification from public or private office,
suspended sentence, consecutive or concurrent sentences, and
restitution.

But Lipsky did not hold that the standard to be
9

followed by the trial court in determining whether or not to
reduce a sentence was a very wide discretion as claimed by the
defendant.
No plain error has been shown because the trial court's
comments are similar in nature to the actual statutory standard
imposed upon the trial court.
If the court, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the
defendant was found guilty and to the history
and character of the defendant, concludes it
would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that degree of
offense . . . may . . . enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of
offense and impose sentence accordingly.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995).
Clearly the statute does not endow a very wide discretion,
but rather requires a weighing of the crime, the defendant, and
the statutory punishment, to determine if the imposition of the
statutory punishment would be unduly harsh.

It was not plain

error for the trial court to not consider itself to have almost
absolute discretion as to whether or not to reduce the sentence.
Given the language of the statute, the defendant has failed to
show that the trial court committed plain error in not believing
itself to have the very wide discretion claimed for it by the
defendant.
10

Even if this Court were to assume, as does the defendant,
that the words of the trial court demonstrate it not only used
the wrong standard, but committed plain error, the defendant has
failed to show that he has been harmed by the alleged error.
There has been no showing that, absent the alleged error, a
different result would have occurred.
The trial court gave a full explanation of why the defendant
would not be placed on probation.

R. 98-99.

Judge Hanson found

that both the nature and circumstances of the offense, and the
history and character of the defendant led him to deny probation.
These same facts led the trial court to deny the motion to reduce
the sentence.

The defendant has failed to demonstrate that,

absent the alleged error, a different result would have occurred.
The only reason given by the defendant in opposing the trial
court's denial of his motion to reduce was that the reduction
should be granted because the defendant had entered a plea
agreement and not gone to trial.

R. 97.

This does not even go

to the statutory test for deciding whether or not a sentence
should be reduced.

No reasonable likelihood of a different

result has been shown.
Defendant has failed to show that the trial court committed
plain error, and therefore the defendant cannot raise his
11

challenge to the trial court's sentence for the first time on
appeal.
III. THE TRIAL COURT USED THE CORRECT
STANDARD IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
REDUCE SENTENCE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in using the
phrase "in the interest of justice" in explaining why it was
denying the defendant's motion to reduce his sentence.

Defendant

claims that the trial court had very wide discretion in making
this decision.

Defendant's position is contrary to the explicit

language of the statute in question.
If the court, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the
defendant was found guilty and to the history
and character of the defendant, concludes it
would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that degree of
offense . . . may . . . enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of
offense and impose sentence accordingly.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1995).
The statute authorizes the court to reduce the conviction
and the sentence one degree only when, based upon a review of the
crime and the defendant, the statutory sentence would be "unduly
harsh."

Utah f s statute is based on the Model Penal Code.

Penal Code §6.12, 10 U.L.A. 513 (Master Edition).

Model

This "unduly

harsh" standard was never meant to give broad discretion to the
12

trial court in reducing sentences, but rather to permit the court
to correct those inevitable cases where a conviction and sentence
in accordance with the statute would seem unduly harsh to the
court.

State v. Megarcrel. 673 A.2d 259, 264 (N.J. 1996).

Unduly is defined as "1. Excessively: immoderately. 2.

improperly: wrongfully."
Dictionary 1259 (1988).

Webster's II New Riverside University
In Estate of Sarabia. 270 Cal. Rptr.

560, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990), the court affirmed a supplementary
jury instruction which defined unduly as "generally it is
something that's unwarranted, excessive, inappropriate,
unjustifiable or improper."
If the word unduly is given its normal meaning, it becomes
clear that the trial court did not have a very wide discretion to
reduce the sentence and conviction in this case.

Instead, the

statutory authority to reduce a conviction and sentence is meant
for those few cases where, given the particular facts of the
matter, the punishment imposed by the legislature would be
excessively, unjustifiably, or wrongfully harsh.
While the trial court appears to have used the phrase
"interest of justice" as a simpler and shorter means of
describing this test, there is no proof in the record that the
trial court failed to use the statutory test appropriately.
13

In State v. Nelson. 740 P.2d 835, 842 (Wash. 1987), the
court explained that "[i]mposing a penalty which is within the
standard range but unduly harsh, considering the circumstances of
a case, does not

f

[p]romote respect for the law by providing

punishment which is just."
present case.

That is not the circumstance in the

The defendant failed to convince the trial court

that a five to life sentence would be unduly harsh given the
nature of the crime and the charactei of the defendant. While
the trial court has discretion to weigh the statutory factors, it
does not have a very wide discretion to ignore them.
The unduly harsh standard permits the trial court, in
exceptional cases, to reduce the sentence so as to avoid a
sentence that would be wrongfully harsh.
case.

This was not such a

The trial court's decision to deny the motion to reduce

should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial courtfs sentence of
Wright should be affirmed and the defendant's request for remand
for resentencing be denied.

14

ORAL ARGUMENT AND A PUBLISHED OPINION NOT
REQUESTED BY THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
The State of Utah does not request oral argument and a
published opinion in this matter.

The questions raised in this

appeal are not such that oral argument or a published opinion are
necessary, though the State of Utah desires to participate in
oral argument if such is held by the Court.
Respectfully submitted this

//

of August, 1997.
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Assistant Attorney General
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